In August 1972, the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly approved the agreements. SALT-I, as it has been called, served as the basis for all subsequent arms restrictions talks. The first discussions between the parties focused on the weapons systems to be included, the factors involved in ensuring equality in the number of strategic nuclear launchers, taking into account the significant differences between the forces of the two sides, the prohibition of new systems, qualitative limitations and a Soviet proposal to include US forward-based systems. The parties` positions were very different on many of these issues. The link between restrictions on strategic weapons and open issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, above all, Vietnam became central to Nixon and Kissinger`s policy of détente. By using Linkage, they hoped to change the nature and course of American foreign policy, including American foreign policy. the policies of nuclear disarmament and arms control and to separate them from those practiced by Nixon`s predecessors. They also intended to link US arms control policy to part of the détente. […] Its liaison policy had indeed failed. It failed mainly because it was based on erroneous assumptions and false premises, the most important of which was that the Soviet Union wanted many more strategic arms limitation agreements than the United States. [9] To date, there is no such verification regime for nuclear warheads.
Conceptually, great strides have been made in recent years, in particular within the framework of the International Partnership for Verification of Nuclear Disarmament (IPNDV), a cooperation between approximately 25 nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It is not clear what led to the disappearance of the INF Treaty. Both sides were less enthusiastic about the treaty, as other states are not bound by similar restraint. But the nail in the coffin for the United States was Russia`s development and deployment of a medium-range GlCM called the 9M729. Nixon was proud that, through his diplomatic skill, he reached an agreement that his predecessors could not reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to combine arms control with détente and solve other pressing problems through what Nixon called “liaison.” David Tal argues: SALT I is the common name of the Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms signed on May 26, 1972. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels and only planned the addition of new submarine launchers (SLBMs) after the dismantling of the same number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and older SLBM launchers. [2] SALT I also limited land ICBMs that were within range of the northeastern border of the continental United States to the northwestern border of the continental USSR. [3] In addition, SALT I limited to 50 the number of SLBM-enabled submarines that NATO and the United States could operate with up to 800 SLBM launchers. If the United States or NATO increased this number, the USSR could respond by increasing its arsenal by the same amount.
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